DOW-UAP-D185, Review of AAWSAP Special Access Program Request, November 2009
DIA memo on Reid request for AAWSAP special access (2009)
People named in this file: Harry Reid
niche or mildly interesting
UAP Insight significance score
- Location
- Washington, D.C.
- Incident date
- 11/13/09
- Released
- November 20, 2026
UAP Characteristics
Government Programs Referenced
What the record concludes
Official Conclusion
DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP for the program; insufficient grounds to classify the program, invoke ACCM, or establish a SAP.
Official Description
This document is an administrative or programmatic record related to the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP), a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-administered program active from 2008 to 2012. AAWSAP’s official scope of work identified 12 technical research areas relating to potential aerospace threats over a time horizon of more than 40 years. As an administrative record, the file documents how AAWSAP was scoped, organized, tasked, funded, or described at a particular point in time. This November 2009 DIA information memorandum evaluates Senator Harry Reid’s June 2009 request (DOW-UAP-D183) to place portions of the AAWSAP contract, described in his letter under the alternate name “Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program” (AAITP), into a restricted Special Access Program (SAP). The memorandum concludes that DIA could not find adequate justification for such a step, stating that all first-year program documents had been unclassified, that the contractor had not established a secure facility during that period, and that DIA was unaware of any delivered report containing information sensitive enough to warrant additional compartmentation. It further argues that the available material did not meet the threshold for original classification, in part because much of it consisted of publicly available scientific or technical information, and it characterizes Reid’s claims of highly sensitive findings as more plausibly referring to future phases of the effort than to the reports already delivered. In effect, the document is a formal internal finding that Senator Reid’s SAP request was not warranted, grounded in DIA’s view that the program’s first-year outputs did not justify heightened protection beyond normal classification procedures.
Key Findings
- →DIA concluded it could not find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract.
- →All FY2009 program documents delivered to the Defense Warning Office were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure facility and employees were still being vetted.
- →In FY2010 four to six technical reports on foreign research were expected to contain classified data, likely derivatively classified at the secret level.
- →DIA stated the report information is not owned or controlled by the U.S. government and is publicly available, so original classification was inadvisable.
- →DIA assumed Senator Reid's references to 'highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings' referred to future program phases and security/counterintelligence concerns.
A November 2009 DIA info memo, signed by Deputy Director Letitia A. Long, responds to an OUSD(I) request to evaluate Senator Harry Reid's request to establish a restricted SAP for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP), which Reid's letter calls AAITP. DIA concludes there is insufficient justification, citing unclassified first-year deliverables and no information requiring ACCM or SAP protection. A DIA routing/coordination sheet is attached.
Analyst Notes
Administrative/programmatic memo with no UAP sighting or incident content. It reflects DIA's internal view on classification of program deliverables, not evidence of anomalous phenomena. Redactions are limited to names and contact details (1843(a)(3), AAP Person 1) and FOUO markings are struck through.
In this file
Cite this document
Department of War. "DOW-UAP-D185, Review of AAWSAP Special Access Program Request, November 2009." PURSUE Release 8, released 2026-11-20, war.gov/UFO. https://war.gov/medialink/ufo/docs-112026-release-08/DOW-UAP-D185-Review_of_AAWSAP_Special_Access_Program_Request_November-2009.pdf. Transcript and analysis: UAP Insight, https://uapinsight.com/gov/doc/bfd060d825366920.
Full transcript · 3 pages
Machine transcription by Claude Haiku 5.5 — it may contain errors; check the original. Redacted text stays redacted.
Show the transcriptHide the transcript
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100 INFO MEMO U-09-2660/CE NOV 1 3 2009 FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE FROM: Letitia A. Long, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request (U//FOUO) This info memo responds to your request for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Defense Warning Office (DWO) to evaluate a request from Senator Harry Reid (enclosure 1) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in Senator Reid's letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production in fiscal year (FY) 2010, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP. (U//FOUO) All program documents delivered to DWO during FY 2009 (the first year of the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. In FY 2010, most research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke alternative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restricted SAP. • (U//FOUO) Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Program guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated information obtained from previously classified material (para C3.1.1). Future reports that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the original classification authority (para C3.1.2.1.1). • (U//FOUO) Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable: Information contained in the reports is not owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the U.S. government (para C2.3.1.1). DIA cannot identify any damage that UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO could result from unauthorized disclosure (para C2.3.1.3) of publically available information. Although the information can loosely be tied to one of the eligibility criteria for classification (scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security (para C2.3.2.5)), DIA is prohibited from classifying basic scientific research, and its result, unless it clearly relates to national security (para C2.4.3.2). This requirement has not been met. • (U//FOUO) In the second paragraph of his letter, Senator Reid cites "the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings" that will "require extraordinary protection." Although most of the unclassified reports discuss unconventional aerospace technologies, DIA is unaware of any report containing information sufficiently sensitive and vulnerable to require extra protection associated with either ACCM or a restricted SAP (paras C6.8.1.2 and C8.1.1.3). DIA assumes these statements are in reference to future phases of this program and highlight security and counterintelligence concerns that appear to be the main focus of Senator Reid's letter. (U//FOUO) Pursuant to a request from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Special Programs staff[AAP Person 1] DWO contract officer for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, has forwarded draft copies of technical reports from the first year, which will be published in the coming months. If you have questions about the contents of these reports, please contact [1843(a)(3)] the Defense Warning Office. He will arrange to have [AAP Person 1] review the reports with your staff. (U) Prepared by: [1843(a)(3)] Defense Warning Office, [1843(a)(3)] 2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
DIA FORM 96-1 SUBJECT: Review of Special Access Date Received: 4 Nov 09 Date Logged-In: 5-Nov-09 09:26 TO | INITIAL | DATE CS-1C CS-1 | 1843(a)(3) | 03NOV09 12NOV09 CS | 1843(a)(3) | 6 NOV CE Admin DD-XA DD-XO | 1843(a)(3) | [signature] DD DR-XA DR-XO | 1843(a)(3) | [signature] DR 09-21660 CS-1C (Final Disposition) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20340-0001 TO: DD__ Subject: Review of Special Access Request Ms. Long: Attached please revised subject info memo to OUSD(I) for your review and approval. This version incorporates CP comments. Very Respectfully, 1843(a)(3) CS-1 Need DAC a CP to review RAP. 11.13.09 1843(a)(3)
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