A 2009 letter from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III is an early official record requesting Restricted SAP protection for AATIP, a DIA-linked advanced aerospace threat program involving Bigelow Aerospace contractors.
DOW-UAP-D183-Correspondence from Senator Harry Reid, June 2009
Harry Reid letter on AATIP special access program (2009)
People named in this file: Harry Reid
solid newsworthy item
UAP Insight significance score
- Location
- Washington, D.C.
- Incident date
- 6/24/09
- Released
- November 20, 2026
UAP Characteristics
Government Programs Referenced
What the record concludes
Official Description
This document is an administrative or programmatic record related to the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP), a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-administered program active from 2008 to 2012. AAWSAP’s official scope of work identified 12 technical research areas relating to potential aerospace threats over a time horizon of more than 40 years. As an administrative record, the file documents how AAWSAP was scoped, organized, tasked, funded, or described at a particular point in time. This June 2009 letter from Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III requests that portions of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) be placed under a restricted Special Access Program (SAP) with a tightly controlled access list. The letter states that the Senate had directed DIA to assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats, describes ongoing technical work aligning with AAWSAP’s program areas, and asserts that the program had already produced several highly sensitive unconventional findings. On that basis, Reid states that ordinary classified information handling practices, and even conventional SAP procedures, would be insufficient to safeguard some parts of the effort, particularly those involving collection methodology, engineering application, industry participation, and the identities of specialized personnel. The attached material proposes a preliminary SAP structure, including a bigoted-access list, a tentative program timeline through Fiscal Year 2013, and continued roles for both government and BAASS personnel. AARO Comment: In the administrative record surrounding this program, “Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program” (AATIP) appears in some documents as an alternate name for the same underlying AAWSAP effort, rather than as a wholly separate program. In this context, Senator Reid used the term in public correspondence in lieu of the AAWSAP program name.
Key Findings
- →Reid states the Senate mandated DIA since the prior September to assess far-term (40+ years) foreign advanced aerospace threats, covering lift, propulsion, unconventional materials, signature reduction, weaponry, and human interface/effects.
- →Reid asserts AATIP had identified 'several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings' and that future technology advances would need extraordinary protection.
- →The letter requests a Restricted SAP with a Bigoted Access List covering AATIP methodology, personnel/oversight allocation, and application/engineering, citing counterintelligence risk from Foreign Intelligence Security Services.
- →The letter references exotic technologies involving quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravity, and thermodynamics that adversaries could use with catastrophic effects.
- →Attachment 1 lists the program as FY09-FY13 (preliminary), with FY09 O&M funding and later years TBD, and lists Lynn, Reid, Sen. Daniel Inouye, and Robert T. Herbert among government personnel, plus BAASS contractors.
A June 24, 2009 letter from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III requesting that portions of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) be placed under a Restricted Special Access Program with a 'Bigoted' (restricted) access list. Attachment 1 outlines a preliminary SAP structure: sponsoring agency, FY09-FY13 timeline, funding, and government and Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies (BAASS) contractor personnel lists, with some names redacted. The document is administrative and contains no description of any specific UAP sighting.
Analyst Notes
Administrative/programmatic request letter with no UAP sighting, sensor data, or witness accounts. Claims of 'highly sensitive, unconventional findings' are asserted without any supporting detail. Redactions are limited to staff contact details and some personnel names. Reid's letter uses the AATIP name, which AARO says refers to the AAWSAP effort.
In this file
Cite this document
Department of War. "DOW-UAP-D183-Correspondence from Senator Harry Reid, June 2009." PURSUE Release 8, released 2026-11-20, war.gov/UFO. https://war.gov/medialink/ufo/docs-112026-release-08/DOW-UAP-D183-Correspondence_from_Senator_Harry_Reid_June_24-2009.pdf. Transcript and analysis: UAP Insight, https://uapinsight.com/gov/doc/e3d37426a3f3a880.
Full transcript · 4 pages
Machine transcription by Claude Haiku 5.5 — it may contain errors; check the original. Redacted text stays redacted.
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HARRY REID NEVADA MAJORITY LEADER United States Senate WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012 June 24, 2009 Honorable William Lynn III Deputy Secretary of Defense 1010 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1010 Dear Secretary Lynn: Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects. Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AATIP) and study were first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AATIP. In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to future systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level: • The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AATIP. o Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).
o Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program. • Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight. o Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk. o Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny. o Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP. o Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the U.S. Government in this program. • Application and engineering. o The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List. o Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravitics, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be used with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required. Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.
Ultimately, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the U.S. Government but I believe will directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will provide the U.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its preeminence as a world leader. Thank you in advance from your time and consideration of this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact 1843(a)(2) of my staff at 1843(a)(2) Sincerely, HARRY REID United States Senator HR:rth
Attachment 1 Sponsoring Agency: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF) Component-level SAP Central Office: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF) Unclassified Nickname: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) Program Length: FY09-FY13 (Preliminary) Program Funding: FY09-O&M, FY10-FY13-TBD SAP Category Designation: Intelligence, DoD Acquisition FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Government Personnel: 1. Honorable William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't) 2. Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Gov't) 3. Honorable Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii (Gov't) 4. Robert T. Herbert (U.S. Senate) 5. AAP Person 1 (Gov't) 6. AAP Person 2 (Gov't) 7. AAP Person 91 (Gov't) 8. AAP Person 92 (USN) 9. AAP Person 93 (USMC) 10. AAP Person 3 (Gov't) 11. AAP Person 94 (Gov't) FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP: 1. AAP Person 4 Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies LLC (BAASS), (CTR) 2. AAP Person 7 BAASS (CTR) 3. AAP Person 57 BAASS (CTR) This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA, Exemptions 1 and 5 apply.
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